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Risk Administration in the Marketplace:
A Reappraisal of the Independent
Contractor Rule
Under the rule of respondeat superior, a master is liable for torts
that his servants commit within the scope of their employment.1 When
the servant can be characterized as an independent contractor, how-
ever, the employer is not liable.2 Yet the servant and independent
contractor are nearly indistinguishable in an economic sense; in both
cases the superior commands, finances, and profits from the work done.
Because of this similarity of function, courts have never been able to
define clearly which employees are servants and which are contractors, 3
and both courts and commentators have found it difficult to develop
a convincing, manageable justification for the two different rules of
liability.4
1 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 26.6 (1956); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS § 70 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958).
2 Robbins v. Chicago, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 667 (1867); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 1,
§ 26.11, at 1395; W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 71, at 468; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 409 (1965).
3 Crowell v. Benson, 285 US. 22, 82 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting): "Whether an in-
dividual is an employee or an independent contractor depends upon criteria often subtle
and uncertain of application .... " See also text and notes at notes 51-55 infra. The task
of the courts is made more difficult by the common commercial practice of attempting to
disguise a master/servant relationship as that of employer/independent contractor. 2 F.
HARPER & F. JAMEs, supra note 1, § 26.11, at 1396. The difficulty of the distinction has led
to the unsurprising result that courts often differ about the status of an employee in es-
sentially similar fact situations. Compare Mirto v. News-Journal Co., 50 Del. 103, 123
A.2d 863 (1956) with Bigger v. Consolidated Underwriters, 315 S.W.2d 681 (rex. Civ. App.
1958) (reaching contrary results on the status of a newsboy). The courts have not been
above using the ambiguity in the definitions of servants and contractors to expand the
category of servants. Cf. Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of
Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 546 (1961); James, Vicarious Liability, 28 TUL. L. REV. 161, 201-02
(1954); Steffen, Independent Contractor and the Good Life, 2 U. CHI. L. RFv. 501, 508-09
(1935). Another method of accomplishing the same objective has been to rest the burden of
proving the independent status of the contractor on the party who asserts it. This pro-
cedure has been used where the various tests the courts use do not provide a dear distinc-
tion between servants and contractors. E.g., F.H. Vahlsing v. Adames, 360 S.W.2d 911
(rex. Civ. App. 1962); F. Perlman & Co. v. Gillian, 355 S.W.2d 638, 647 (Tenn. 1961). In
expanding employer liability, the courts have received the assistance of the legislatures,
which have, through workmen's compensation laws, provided a broader definition of the
master/servant relationship. Cf. A. LARSON, IA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw § 43.00
(1967).
4 Virtually all the leading literature on the subject was written over thirty years ago.
N.Y. LAw REVISION COMM. REPORT OF THE LAW REvisiON COMMISSION OF 1939, at 409 (1939);
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These difficulties have generated a complex body of law. The general
rule that an employer is not liable for the torts of an independent
contractor has been weakened during the last century by numerous
exceptions. 5 Commentators agree that the law is now unpredictable
and inconsistent, 6 and several question whether the exceptions have
swallowed the rule.7 The complexity of the law imposes administrative
costs on the tort system, and its unpredictability poses problems for
both employers and employees in insuring against liability.
This comment briefly notes the development of the present indepen-
dent contractor rule and discusses the lack of a consistent judicial
approach in applying the rule's exceptions. It then reexamines the
servant/independent contractor distinction that has led to the present
confusion and argues that the traditional justifications for this distinc-
tion are unpersuasive and unmanageable. The comment concludes that
the basic purposes of tort law--compensation of victims, distribution
of the cost of compensation, and reduction of the amount of injuries$-
are hindered by the present independent contractor doctrine. It pro-
poses a new rule, joint liability supplemented with private indemni-
fication agreements, which would simplify the law and better achieve
the goals of the tort system.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRESENT RULE
Respondeat superior, announced in modem form by Lord Holt in
the seventeenth century,9 developed long before the independent con-
tractor doctrine, and the first case that clearly raised the contractor
issue proceeded from the assumption that respondeat superior was the
Douglas, Vicarious Liability and the Administration of Risk, 38 YALE L.J. 584 (1929);
Harper, The Basis of the Immunity of an Employer of an Independent Contractor, 10
IND. L.J. 494 (1935); Morris, The Torts of an Independent Contractor, 29 IL.. L. REv. 339
(1934); Steffen, supra note 3. More recent critiques of the rule include James, supra note
3, and Williams, Liability for Independent Contractors, 14 CAME. L. REv. 180 (1956).
5 The Restatement has at least twenty sections devoted to exceptions to the independent
contractor rule. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 410-29 (1965). For reviews of the ap-
proach of state courts in handling the exceptions, see Brown, Liability for Torts of In-
dependent Contractors in West Virginia, 55 W. VA. L. REV. 216 (1953), and Comment,
Liability for the Torts of Independent Contractors in California, 44 CAL. L. REv. 762
(1956).
6 Comment, Responsibility for the Torts of an Independent Contractor, 39 YALE L.J. 861,
862 (1930); 28 RocKY MT. L. REv. 128, 131 (1955).
7 Pacific Fire Ins. Co. v. Kenny Boiler & Mfg. Co., 201 Minn. 500, 503, 277 N.W. 226
(1937); W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 71, at 468; RESTATEMEw (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409,
comment b (1965).
8 Cf. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUDIS 29, 30-31 (1972).
9 For a full discussion of the development of both respondeat superior and the in-
dependent contractor rule, see James, supra note 3, at 164-65; Comment, supra note 6.
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correct solution. In 1799, the Court of Common Pleas held in Bush v.
Steinman that the owner of a house was liable for injuries caused by
an obstruction placed in the road by a contractor indirectly in his
employ.'0 Subsequent cases modified the rule of liability, however, and
by 1825 employers were held to be immune from liability." Through-
out this period, there was little discussion by the courts of the reason
for the change.'2 Around 1850 courts decided, again without regard
to any coherent rationale, that a pure rule eliminating master's lia-
bility would be unfortunate. They began moving in the opposite
direction, 3 producing numerous exceptions to the rule but without
disavowing the general principle of employer nonliability. The current
10 1 Bos. & P. 404 (C.P. 1799). The obstruction was apparently placed in the road by
a limeburner under a contract with a carpenter; the carpenter was under a contract with
a surveyor who, in turn was under a contract with the owner. The court found a number
of policy reasons to support imposing liability on the owner. Although Chief Justice
Eyre "felt difficulty in stating the precise principle on which this action is founded," he
nevertheless stated: "Where a civil injury of the kind now complained of has been
sustained the remedy ought to be obvious, and the person injured should have only to
discover the owner of the house which was the occasion of the mischief; not be compelled
to enter into the concerns between that owner and other persons, the inconvenience of
which would be more heavily felt than any which would arise from circuity of action." Id.
at 408. Judge Rooke argued that an owner should have "control over all those persons
who work on his premises, and he shall not be allowed to discharge himself from that in-
tendment of the law by any act or contract of his own." Id. at 409. Both he and Judge
Heath found additional grounds for the decision in the benefit that the owner derived
from the work. Id. at 409-10.
11 In Laugher v. Pointer, 5 B. & C. 547 (K.B. 1826), where the owner of a carriage who
hired a driver and horse from a livery stable was held not liable for the negligence of the
driver, the court (dividing 2-2) reasoned: (1) the carriage owner had no contract with the
driver since he was under no legal duty to pay him, id. at 579 (opinion of Abbot, C.J.);
(2) the owner did not choose the driver and had no control over him, id. at 562 (opinion
of Litfledale, J.); and (3) there was a possibility of a multiplicity of suits, id. at 559,
(opinion of Littledale, J.). The court reached this result despite ciearly contradictory dicta
in Bush v. Steinman: "As where a person hires a coach upon a job, and a job-coachman
is sent with it, the person who hires the coach is liable for any mischief done by the
coachman while in his employ, though he is not his servant." 4 Bos. & P. 404, 409 (C.P.
1799) (opinion of Heath, J.). Subsequent cases limited Bush to cases involving injury con-
nected with real property ownership, e.g., Quarman v. Burnett, 6 M. & W. 499 (1840); it
was finally overruled entirely in Reedie v. London & N.W. Ry., 4 Ex. 244 (1849).
12 In Milligan v. Wedge, 12 A. & E. 737 (Q.B. 1840), Williams, J., remarked: "The dif-
ficulty always is, to say whose servant the person is that does the injury: when you decide
that, the question is solved.... For, where the person who does the injury exercises an
independent employment the party employing him is clearly not liable." Id. at 741-42.
Coleridge, J. added: "Unless the relation of master and servant existed between them,
the act of one creates no liability in the other." Id. at 742; accord, Overton v. Freeman, 3
Car. & K. 49 (C.P. 1851); Knight v. Fox, 5 Ex. 721 (1850); Peahey v. Rowland, 13 C.B.
182 (1853).
13 Eliis v. Sheffield Gas Consumers Co., 2 E. & B. 767 (1853). The employer was held
liable because the work was being done without a permit and was thus illegal. Contra,
Jourdenais v. Hayden, 104 Vt. 215, 158 A. 664 (1932).
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rule embraces twenty or more exceptions, each so vague that its appli-
cation often seems to depend not on any policy but upon purely ran-
dom factors, such as the court's attitude toward the parties.14 This
inadequacy can be illustrated by a review of the three major excep-
tions to the independent contractor rule:'15 the employer is liable for
harms caused in the performance of inherently dangerous work16 and
nondelegable duties,' 7 and for the torts of incompetent contractors.',
A. The Inherent Danger Exception
The "inherent danger" execption' 9 to the independent contractor
rule relies on the notion that certain activities are dangerous absent
precautions, 20 or that they are dangerous even if precautions are
taken.21 Just as the concept of "inherent danger" and "ultrahazardous
activities" proved unstable elsewhere in tort law, leading to strict lia-
bility and the abolition of the privity defense, z2 the concept in the
independent contractor context proved equally incapable of satisfac-
tory definition.23 When courts are forced to distinguish inherently
dangerous activities from merely dangerous activities, apparently irra-
tional categories develop, and courts often reach inconsistent results.
2 4
14 Cf. 38 ALl PROCEEDINGS 128-24 (1961).
15 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409, comment b (1965).
16 E.g., Miles v. Arena & Co., 23 Cal. App. 680, 73 P.2d 1260 (1937).
17 E.g., Capitol Chevrolet Co. v. Lawrence Warehouse Co., 227 F.2d 169 (9th Cir. 1955).
18 E.g., L.B. Foster Co. v. Hurnblad, 418 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1969).
19 The exception was established in Bower v. Peate, [1876] 1 Q.B. 321.
20 W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 71, at 472; RESTATmEmNT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 416 (1965)
"[W]ork which the employer should recognize as likely to create during its progress a
peculiar risk of physical harm unless special precautions are taken ......
21 E.g., Bologna v. Battisto, 86 Misc. 2d 297, 235 N.Y.S2d 819 (Albany County Ct. 1962);
Janice v. State, 201 Misc. 915, 107 N.Y.S.2d 674 (Ct. Cl. 1951).
22 See Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L.
Rr-v. 791 (1966).
23 See Tropea v. Shell Oil Co., 307 F.2d 757, 771 (2d Cir. 1962); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMEs,
supra note 1, § 26.11, at 1408-09.
24 In addition to the difficulty in classification, the courts must attempt to distinguish
between extrahazardous activities, which result in strict liability, and inherently dangerous
activities, in which liability is contingent on proof of negligence. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMEs,
supra note 1, § 26.11, at 1408. So long as some courts define inherent danger as anything
that will probably cause injury if due care is not taken, the exception amounts to a
virtual abrogation of the rule of nonliability. See 81 U. PA. L. REV. 232, 283 (1934). Further
complicating the decisions is the rule, which originated in Bower v. Peate, [1876] 1 Q.B.
321, that the employer is not liable where the independent contractor or his servant was
collaterally negligent. By collateral negligence, the courts apparently mean negligence
merely in an operative detail of the work or so disassociated from the inherent or special
danger of the work as not to create employer liability. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note
1, § 26.11, at 1410; W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 71, at 474-75; R.STATErvENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 426 (1965). Many commentators have professed difficulty in understanding pre-
cisely what is meant by collateral negligence. Morris, supra note 4, at 350; Smith, Collateral
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For little apparent reason, fumigating is regarded as inherently danger-
ous,25 for example, while disinfecting railroad cars with a creosote
solution is not.26 Similarly, steam sawmills have been held both to be27
and not to be28 inherently dangerous, while negligently piled beams29
have revealed an insidious character unknown to negligently piled
pipes.3 0 The pattern of the cases has been described quite justifiably
as "divided against itself without reason." 31
In the common case, where the employer's personal fault is not at
issue,32 liability for inherently dangerous activities is sometimes
thought to be based on a policy of preventing the employer from con-
tracting away work that involves a high risk of injury.33 But there is
no obvious reason why society should prefer to impose liability on
employers rather than contractors only in these special cases. Neither
group is necessarily a better risk preventer and neither group is more
likely to be judgment-proof. 34 Another policy said to support the
doctrine is that it gives the employer an incentive for hiring a compe-
tent contractor. If this were the policy, the employer should be im-
mune if he could show he had exercised care to hire a competent con-
tractor; under present law, however, such proof is unavailing.
Negligence, 25 MINN. L. REv. 399 (1941). This is hardly surprising: the principal concept
of inherent danger is difficult to understand and the courts have again reached inconsistent
results in similar fact situations. Compare Hyman v. Barrett, 224 N.Y. 436, 121 N.E. 271
(1918) (board falling from window is not collaterally negligent) with Philadelphia,
B. 9- W. R. Co. v. Mitchell, 107 Md. 600, 69 A. 422 (1908) (hammer falling from bridge is
collaterally negligent.).
25 Baker v. Knight, 205 S.W.2d 65 (rex. Civ. App. 1947).
26 Crow v. McAdoo, 219 S.W. 241 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920). Compare Trump v. Bluefield
Waterworks & Imp. Co., 99 W. Va. 425, 129 S.E. 209 (1925) (constructing dam is inherently
dangerous) with Gadsen v. Craft & Co., 173 N.C. 418, 92 S.E. 174 (1917) (constructing bridge
is not inherently dangerous); Vinton Petroleum Co. v. L. Seiss Oil Syndicate, 19 La. App.
179, 139 So. 543 (1932) (removing decayed structure is inherently dangerous) with Smith v.
Humphreyville, 47 Tex. Civ. App. 140, 104 S.W. 495 (1907) (raising the roof of a building
is not inherently dangerous); Evans v. Elliot, 220 N.C. 253, 17 S.E.2d 125 (1941) (excavating
in or near highway is inherently dangerous) with Dixon v. Robinson, 276 S.W. 770 (rex.
1925) (excavating is not inherently dangerous).
27 Royal v. Pope & Parish, 177 N.C. 206, 98 S.E. 599 (1919).
28 Lovelace v. Ivey, 41 Ga. App. 204, 152 S.E. 266 (1930).
20 Boylhart v. Di Marco & Reiman, 270 N.Y. 217, 200 N.E. 793 (1986).
30 O'Hara v. Laclede Gaslight Co., 244 Mo. 395, 148 S.W. 884 (1912).
31 Williams, supra note 4, at 192.
32 In a limited number of cases, liability rests upon the employer's failure to order safe-
guards, e.g., Ruehl v. Lingerwood Rural Tel. Co., 23 N.D. 6, 135 N.W. 793 (1912), or to
correct improper procedures he knows the contractor is using, e.g., Snow v. Marion Realty
Co., 212 Cal. 622, 299 P. 720 (1931).
33 See Comment, Should the Financial Irresponsibility Theory Become a Reality, 64
DicK. L. Rav. 304, 308 (1960).
34 See text and notes at notes 51-71 infra.
1973]
The University of Chicago Law Review [40:661
B. The Nondelegable Duty Exception
The theory behind the nondelegable duty exception is that certain
responsibilities of the employer are so important that he should not
be allowed to bargain away the risks of performance.3 5 The list of non-
delegable duties is prodigious and seemingly without pattern.30 Com-
mentators have criticized the exception as a "logical fraud," used when
the court has already decided to extend the employer's liability.37 The
numerous sources from which nondelegable duties can spring 8 and
the court's tendency to regard statutory duties as nondelegable unless
the statute itself contains some inhibition against so holding39 suggest
that courts may impose employer liability in almost any situation. As
with the inherent danger exception, it is difficult to understand the
social interest in, for example, refusing to permit an automobile owner
to delegate his "duty" to have brakes in good repair.40 It is difficult to
believe that public safety is maximized by having mechanical tyros fix-
ing their own brakes. Moreover, if public safety were the goal, all
activities should be regarded as nondelegable. In fact, the nondelegable
duty exception does not prevent delegation but rather holds the party
on whom the duty is imposed liable for negligent performance, regard-
less of delegation.41 If this approach is meant to promote victim com-
pensation, it is, at best, a piecemeal means to that end.
35 2 F. HARPER& F. JAMES, supra note 1, § 26.11, at 1406; W. PROSSER, supra note 1,
§ 71, at 471.
36 For eleven random examples, see W. PROSSra, supra note 1, § 71, at 470-71.
37 williams, supra note 4, at 193.
38 Courts have found nondelegable duties arising from common law, Wilson v. Thayer
Co. Agricultural Soc'y, 115 Neb. 579, 213 N.W. 966 (1927); contract, Coenen v. Buckman
Bldg. Corp., 278 Minn. 193, 153 N.W.2d 329 (1967); license, Hodges v. Johnson, 52 F. Supp.
488 (W.D. Va. 1943); franchise, Louis v. Youngren, 12 Ill. App. 2d 198, 138 N.E.2d 696
(1956); corporate charter, Orange v. Pitcairn, 280 Ill. App. 566 (1935); municipal
ordinance, Merola v. Howard Say. Inst., 109 N.J.L. 37, 160 A. 416 (1932); and statute,
Snyder v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 44 Cal. 2d 793, 285 P.2d 912 (1955).
39 Morris, supra note 4, at 353.
40 E.g., Maloney v. Rath, 69 Cal. 2d 442, 71 Cal. Rptr. 897, 445 P.2d 513 (1968).
41 E.g., O'Connor v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 54 R.I. 317, 322, 172 A. 889, 891 (1934). A
repair service was held liable for injuries casued by a repairman-allegedly an independent
contractor-who negligently left oil on which plaintiff, who had no dealings with the
service or the repairman, fell. The court said: "It is reasonable to hold that, in contracting
for the performance of work... one should be permitted ... to assume that he is dealing
with the individual or corporation with whom he has contracted.., to be assured of the
responsibility of the other party to answer for any damages that may be sustained ... by
another person equally entitled to the protection usually arising from dealing with a
substantial concern." The court fails to explain, however, why a complete stranger to the
contract should be "equally entitled to protection" under the court's theory of entitlement
by way of contract. At any rate, where the parties actually contract, they can also agree
as to indemnification. See text and notes at notes 72-81 infra.
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C. The Incompetent Contractor Exception
Liability based upon the employer's choice of an incompetent con-
tractor stems from the belief that the employer "caused" the tort by fail-
ing to exercise reasonable care in the selection of the contractor. But
the courts disagree as to what constitutes incompetence in the contractor
and what the employer must do to discover the contractor's incompe-
tence. Although mere lack of financial responsibility on the part of the
contractor has traditionally been considered insufficient to make him
incompetent,42 an employer who deliberately chooses a financially ir-
responsible contractor may be held liable.43 Indeed, some courts now
seem willing to define incompetency directly in terms of the contractor's
financial irresponsibility.44 Courts also differ over the amount of notice
needed to charge an employer with having an incompetent contractor.
Some demand actual knowledge of the contractor's incompetence; 45
others have held that the contractor's reputation may be so bad as to
put the employer on constructive notice;40 and still others hold that the
employer has an affirmative duty to inquire into the contractor's
competence when the work requires particular skills .4 7 The range of
responsibilities placed on the employer, coupled with the various
judicial standards for what constitutes "incompetence," had led to a
highly complex and unpredictable application of this exception by the
courts.
The terms "inherent danger," "nondelegable duty," and "incompe-
tence" often seem to be little more than slogans that the courts invoke
to assign liability. The terms do not themselves suggest clear, easily ad-
ministered rules of law and may be invoked or ignored at the will of the
court.48 A reexamination of the underlying goals of the tort system
reveals the defects of such an ad hoc approach and, at the same time,
suggests a preferable, alternative rule.
42 Steffen, supra note 3, at 505.
43 E.g., Nelson v. American Cement Plaster Co., 84 Kan. 797, 115 P. 578 (1911). See
also Smith, Scope of the Business: The Borrowed Servant Problem, 38 MICH. L. REV.
1222, 1245 (1940).
44 In Majestic Realty Associates, Inc., v. Toti Contracting Co., 30 N.J. 455, 153 A.2d 321
(1959), the court discusses at length, and with approval, just such a proposal but avoided
the question by invoking the inherent danger exception. For analysis of the Majestic case,
see Comment, Should the Financial Irresponsibility Theory Become a Reality, supra note
33, and 9 CATHoLIC U.L. Rzv. 106 (1960). The Majestic decision's financial irresponsibility
theory was applied in Bennet v. T. & F. Distrib. Co., 117 N.J. Super. 439, 444--45 (1971),
a tort suit against the employer of a travelling salesman who criminally assaulted plain-
tiff's wife.
45 E.g., McGregor v. Hertzman, 98 Ohio App. 473, 129 N.E.2d 845 (1953).
46 E.g., Skelton v. Fekete, 120 Cal. App. 2d 401, 261 P.2d 339 (1953).
47 E.g., Lewis v. Columbus Hosp., 1 App. Div. 2d 444, 151 N.Y.S.2d 391 (1956).
48 Cf. Williams, supra note 4, at 181.
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II. POLICY CHOICES AND THE PRESENT RULE
Each exception to the general rule of employer nonliability may re-
flect a judicial attempt to accommodate the law to the economic and
legal problems of particular classes of cases, involving particular in-
dustries or employment situations. Courts may alter the rules to fit
particular cases in order to achieve some basic purpose of tort law, such
as the desire to prevent accidents, compensate victims or distribute the
costs of compensation. In a famous article Mr. Justice (then Profes-
sor) Douglas argued that the rules of liability in contractor cases could
be explained as a judicial balancing of the ability of the parties to
prevent and distribute accident costs. 49 This "administration of risk"
theory of the independent contractor cases involved four factors: avoid-
ance, shifting, prevention and distribution. ° Risk avoidance is the
ability of the parties to refrain from a particular risk-engendering
activity. Since this option is open to both the employer and indepen-
dent contractor, their risk avoidance abilities are equal. 51 Risk shifting
is the ability to contract with another party, usually an insurance com-
pany, to assume the risk for a fee. Douglas argued that the employer
and independent contractor have equal capacity to shift risk because
each can foresee and provide for it.52
The principal can prevent risk by hiring competent subordinates,
training them well, and supervising them closely. The principal can
also distribute the cost of assuming the risk53 by raising prices to cus-
tomers, by cutting production costs, and by reducing profits. Thus
courts might attempt, in particular employment situations, to discover
who is the better risk preventer or cost distributor and, by balancing
such factors, create a rule of liability for that group of situations.
49 Douglas, supra note 4, at 598-602.
50 Id. at 587-602.
51 Id. at 598-99.
52 Id. at 599. Neither the employer nor the contractor will perfectly calculate a given
risk because all the relevant information is never available and the cost of a perfect cal-
culation may outweigh its benefit. Often both parties are in relatively equal positions to
shift risks; for example, the probability of a traffic accident is known equally to a
manufacturer and its delivery firm. Moreover, since the calculus of the quantum of risk is
a highly complex proposition, it is doubtful that simple experience-without knowledge
of actuarial techniques--could place a party in a superior position to evaluate a risk. See
Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process-The Insignificance of Foresight, 70
YALE L.J. 554, 560-67 (1961). To the extent that parties rely upon insurers, who are
experts at calculating risk, any difference in their abilities disappears. Thus, if both
parties have equal access to the insurance market, there is no prima fade method of
deciding which of them is better able to shift the risk.
53 The cost of assuming the risk is the cost of risk shifting-insurance premiums-or
payouts in torts suits if the risk administrator self-insures. For simplicity, this analysis
assumes that an insurance policy is procured.
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The usefulness of Douglas's analysis, like other analyses of the con-
tractor rule,54 is limited because he employed these factors only to
rationalize what the courts actually do. It is necessary, however, to go
further and ask what the courts should do. It is important to under-
stand the relative abilities of the employer and contractor to prevent
risks, to distribute risks, and to compensate victims. The assumption
underlying the present rule-that prevention, distribution, and com-
pensation can be maximized by imposing liability on only one of the
two parties-is incorrect. The courts cannot easily identify a single
party who is better able to accomplish these objectives. Even if the
courts might theoretically be able to identify the proper party on
whom to impose liability, the task imposes great difficulties in practice
and creates an overly complex and unpredictable body of law. The
economic marketplace is a more efficient decision-maker in these mat-
ters, and a rule of single party liability is defective precisely because it
distorts the normal play of market forces.
A. Risk Prevention
In both the master/servant and employer/independent contractor
relationships the superior employs the subordinate to accomplish a
task and profits from the result.15 Courts have distinguished servants
from independent contractors on the basis of the "right of control":
the superior retains control over the former but not the latter.56 A
54 See authorities cited note 4 supra.
55 See authorities cited note 3 supra. Two of the reasons most often given for imposi-
tion of liability on the master under respondeat superior-namely, profit and deep pocket
-- do not provide justifications for insulating the employer of the independent contractor.
The profit justification-that since the superior stands to gain by the performance of the
work, he should also absorb the losses-is equally applicable to both the servant's master
and the contractor's employer. See generally Harper, supra note 4, at 496. The deep pocket
justification does not serve to distinguish between the two since either may have the
deeper pocket depending upon the circumstances. On the deep pocket theory, see T. BATY,
VicAsuous LIABILrrY 154 (1916); G. CALABREsI, THE CosTs OF ACcmENTs 40-42 (1970);
Williams, supra note 4, at 195.
56 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 2(3), 220(1) (1958). This ground for the distinc-
tion has been relied upon since the earliest cases. E.g., Boswell v. Laird, 8 Cal. 469, 68
Am. Dec. 345 (1857); Blake v. Ferris, 5 N.Y. (1 Seld.) 48, 55 Am. Dec. 304 (1851). See gen-
erally Stevens, The Test of the Employment Relation, 38 Micss. L. REv. 188 (1939). In
attempting to discern whether this requisite right of control was present, courts asked
such questions as: who decided the methods of work and the hours, who furnished tools
and materials, what was the method of payment and duration of employment, was the
person performing the task a skilled artisan, did he work exclusively for the employer,
and did he exercise independent skill and judgment. AssocATION OF SUPREME COURT
JusncEs, CorMrrrEE ON PATTERN JURY INsTRUCTIONS, 12 N.Y. PATrERN JURY INSTRUCIONS-
CIvIL 255 (1965); REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2). None of these factors were
dispositive of the issue of control, however; in many instances some factors pointed to a
master/servant relationship, while others were more typical of an employer/contractor
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master was supposed to be able to discourage the torts of his servant by
firing, demoting, withholding promotion or refusing to recommend
him.57 Douglas argued that the independent contractor, rather than
his employer, is in this strategic position because he controls his im-
mediate servants and more closely supervises their work 8 An analysis
of the control test as applied by the courts indicates, however, that
neither employer nor contractor is more easily identifiable as better
able to exercise the effective control that risk prevention requires.59
In master/servant cases, the courts ignore how well or prudently the
master exercised his right of control: the mere presence of the right
leads to liability.60 Furthermore, the "control" upon which the master's
liability is predicated stems from his setting things in motion rather
than on specifically ordering particular acts. And one court has com-
mented:
[T]heoretically as well as practically, the master's responsibility
for the negligence goes far beyond his actual or possible control
over the conduct of the servant. It rests on the broader ground
that every man who prefers to manage his affairs through others,
remains bound to so manage them that third persons are not in-
jured by any breach of legal duty on the part of such others while
they are engaged upon his business and within the scope of their
authority.6'
Thus, control in the master/servant relationship is not prudent ex-
ercise of actual control in the economic sense that the master takes
justifiable precautions to avert harms,62 but is rather possession of the
relationship. For a full discussion of the case law revealing the irregular application of the
tests of control, see 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 1, § 26.10, at 1396-1400.
57 Morris, supra note 4, at 341.
58 Douglas, sura note 4, at 601.
59 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 1, § 26.3, at 1367-68; W. PRossER supra note 1,
§ 70, at 461; Drake, Wage-Slave or Entrepreneur?, 31 MoD. L. REv. 408, 414-15 (1968).
0 2 F. HaPER & F. JAMES, supra note 1, § 26.3, at 1367, and cases cited therein. See,
e.g., LeBlanc v. Nye Motor Co., 102 Vt. 194, 199, 147 A. 265, 266 (1929), finding a car sales-
man to be a servant. The court stated: "While it appears that [the employer] exercised no
control over [the salesman's] work in other particulars, it does not appear that it did not
have the right to do so." (Emphasis in original).
61 Wolf v. Sulik, 93 Conn. 431, 436-37, 106 A. 443, 444 (1919).
62 Under the modern view of negligence as failure to take cost justified precautions, a
person is liable for injuries to others if the cost of his preventing the injury is less than
the accident cost. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). See
generally Posner, supra note 8. Thus, if the cost of repairing A's car brakes is $20 and
the accident cost of driving a car without brakes is $100, A is liable for injuries that result
if he fails to repair his car. But if A hires B as a servant, and B, acting in the scope of
his employment, is negligent, A will be liable. The obvious and oft-repeated reason for
this is that servants are said to be judgment-proof as a class and thus presumably not
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right of control. In the employer/independent contractor relationship,
however, the right to control is initially vested in the employer, who
then contracts with the contractor concerning its exercise. From this
perspective, therefore, the servant and independent contractor situa-
tions are indistinguishable. Although the contractor can control his
employees and subcontractors, the employer can exercise control over
the contractor both in right and in practice by placing in the employ-
ment contract conditions on performance. 63 The owner can retain a
broad general power of supervision and control as to the results of the
work so as to insure satisfactory performance of the contract-includ-
ing the right to inspect, the right to make suggestions or recommenda-
tions as to details of the work, the right to prescribe alterations and
deviations in the work, and the right to cancel the contract for failure
to observe conditions-all without changing the independent contrac-
tor relationship.6
One party may exercise greater control in a given situation and
therefore be better able to prevent accidents, but this would justify
placing primary liability on him in that case alone, not wholly insulat-
ing the other in all cases. The uniform rule of liability has perverse
effects on incentives to take precautions. If the employer is made solely
liable, as he is when the duty is nondelegable, the contractor has no
incentive to prevent accidents even when he is able to do so most ef-
ficiently. Assume that there is a type of accident the cost of which is
$100. The employer may be able to prevent it for $80 by closer super-
vision, and the contractor for $50 by use of a different type of tool. If
the duty is "nondelegable" the employer will invest $80 and the harm
will be averted. But if the contractor were responsible instead, he
would have an incentive to invest $50 to avert the harm, a saving of
$30. The outcome is equally inefficient when the employer can prevent
accidents at a lower cost but the contractor is held liable. As in the
example above, the accident costs $100; the employer can avert the
harm for the same $80, but the contractor would have to expend $120.
If only the contractor is liable, and he cannot contract with the em-
ployer concerning liability, he will allow the accident to occur, whereas
deterred by the prospect of financial liability for their torts. Liability is shifted to the
master who is presumed responsive to such an economic threat. The effect of respondeat
superior is, however, to make A strictly liable for B's torts committed in his scope of
employment. Posner, supra note 8, at 42-43. To approach this another way, the
employer's liability is not based on his failure to take cost justified precautions in selecting,
training and supervising his employee. If the employee is negligent, application of re-
spondeat superior results in liability to the employer.
63 See, e.g., the contract in Sword v. Gulf Oil Corp., 251 F.2d 829, 831 (5th Cir. 1958).
64 See McDonald v. Shell Oil Co., 44 Cal. 2d 785, 790, 285 P.2d 902, 904 (1955).
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the employer could have prevented the harm and saved $20 in the pro-
cess. 65
B. Risk Distribution
Savings may be generated if either party is able to "distribute" the
cost of risk at lower cost. One party may, by engaging in fewer costly
transactions than the other, be able to collect risk expenses from con-
sumers, workers, or other factors of production, or shareholders. 66
Proponents of the risk distribution theory argue that a contractor is
a businessman and, if he commits a tort in the course of his business,
he, rather than his employer, should be held liable. But servants com-
mit torts pursuant to their business of being a servant and, by the
above reasoning, liability ought to be assignable to the servant rather
than his master.
Nothing in economic theory or practical experience leads to the
conclusion that either employers as a class or independent contractors
as a class are in all cases better able to distribute the costs of risk. A
rule that assigns risk distribution to the independent contractor is
therefore inefficient in cases in which the employer is a better distribu-
tor. Even if it is assumed that "enterpreneurs" as a class are better risk
distributors, the current rule does not follow. The superior, whether
he is master, employer or contractor, may be an entrepreneur capable
of distributing costs. But not all masters, employers, and contractors
are entrepreneurs, and, therefore, the rule may sometimes place lia-
bility on a party who is not in the best position to distribute risks.
Neither the independent contractor nor his employer is the inher-
ently superior risk distributor,67 since either party usually can, with
equal facility, contract with an insurance company, which is, of course,
highly effective in distributing such risks. The employer can distribute
the cost of insurance by raising prices, lowering production costs or
decreasing profits. If the independent contractor must purchase the
insurance, he will increase the price he charges the employer.
65 In fact, a general liability rule might impose a disincentive to the employer's exer-
cise of control, since he might fear that an extensive supervision of work procedures
would lead to his being held liable under the "interference" exception to the contractor
rule. E.g., Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Martin, 148 Tex. 175, 222 S.W.2d 995 (1949).
66 Since risk distribution focuses on the ability of the businessman to distribute costs
through the operation of the market, it has also been called the "entrepreneur theory."
Calabresi, supra note 3; Douglas, supra note 4, at 585-86; Morris, supra note 4, at 340-41;
Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 CoLuM. L. R1YV. 716 (1923).
67 Douglas suggested that the employer, as the ultimate consumer of the contractor's
services, may be the better risk distributor since "there will be no distribution of these
cost items except through [the employer]." Douglas, supra note 4, at 600. But see Calabresi,
supra note 3, at 509-14.
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The independent contractor sometimes has a higher exposure to the
risk against which insurance is procured, since he engages regularly in
the procedure generating the risk. He may, therefore, be able to pro-
cure insurance at lower costs, since he would have to negotiate with
the company only once to cover a multitude of transactions. But neither
employers nor contractors are as a class preferred insurers. A large
employer may engage in a risk engendering activity more often than a
small contractor whom he hires to perform part of the work. Thus,
while the cheap insurer is the preferable party to bear liability, no
single rule of liability can identify this party in every case.
C. Victim Compensation
The desire to provide an accident victim with recourse against a
solvent defendant, and the fact that it is impossible to predict whether
placing liability upon one class of actors will produce a solvent defen-
dant in a particular case, is widely acknowledged as a major source of
exceptions to the general rule of employer nonliability. 8 Courts are
often faced with situations in which the independent contractor is in-
solvent, unreachable, or, through some oversight, has not been brought
into court. Under such circumstances, the courts are confronted with
a choice between letting the injured party go uncompensated or fixing
liability on the employer who indirectly authorized the commission
of the injury.
Restricting liability to a judgment-proof party defeats the purpose of
compensation since it assigns all costs to the victim. Furthermore, it
leads to a misallocation of resources.69 Since the judgment-proof party
does not include the cost of judgments in his decisions, he will not
take cost-justifiable steps to prevent accidents. The judgment-proof
party will not invest $20 to prevent a $100 harm since the investment
would be a cost to him while an uncollectible judgment would not.70
08 See Kuhn v. P.J. Carlin Constr. Co., 154 Misc. 892, 897-98, 278 N.Y.S. 635, 641 (1935);
Comment, supra note 6, at 872. Indeed it is highly unlikely that a plaintiff would proceed
against an employer unless the contractor were judgment-proof since, while the contractor
is liable on proof of negligence, the employer must also be fit into one of the exceptions.
69 "mTlhe most desirable system of loss distribution under a strict resource-allocation
theory is one in which the prices of goods accurately reflect their full cost to society. The
theory therefore requires, first, that the cost of injuries should be borne by the
activities which caused them . . . .Second, the theory requires that among the several
parties engaged in the enterprise the loss should be placed on the party which is most
likely to cause the burden to be reflected in the price of whatever the enterprise sells."
Calabresi, supra note 3, at 505.
70 Given an insurance premium of $10 to cover the risk the judgment-proof indepen-
dent contractor will be able to refuse to undertake this cost and will thus enjoy a competi-
tive advantage over the non-judgment-proof contractor who must incur this cost (or
self-insure, which results in approximately the same cost in the long run) and would
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But it is impossible to construct a rule of single party liability that will
always hold liable a solvent defendant. Neither independent contrac-
tors nor employers are as a class judgment-proof. The victim can be
assured compensation only if the courts are willing to shift liability
from the employer in one case to the independent contractor in the
next, depending on which is the solvent defendant. But a rule that
leaves the courts so free is no rule at all; it has no predictive value.
A rule that has no predictive value may in turn cause a misalloca-
tion of resources by encouraging both employer and contractor to
purchase insurance or take preventive action to offset liability to a
single defendant. Assume again that the accident cost is $100, and
that either party can prevent it by supervising the work more closely
at a cost of $40. If both parties are solvent and neither can predict
which party will be held liable for the accident, each will assume that
the cost of the potential judgment would be, say, $50-the cost of the
accident discounted by the improbability of a judgment being ren-
dered against him. Each party will therefore invest $40 to prevent the
harm, producing a net loss to society of $40-a loss that a definite rule
of liability could have prevented.
Conversely, if both parties are partially judgment-proof and can pay
only $30 of a potential $100 judgment, neither will take the $40 pre-
caution to avert the $30 loss to him if the accident occurs.
A rule leaving the courts free to assign liability to any solvent de-
fendant produces, therefore, an excessive number of accidents when-
ever both parties are either solvent or insolvent. This seems a high
cost to pay for victim compensation in those few cases in which one
party is solvent and the other not.
D. Summary
All traditional approaches to vicarious liability, including adminis-
tration of risk, are grounded in generalizations about parties to the
employment agreement. They assume that one class of defendants has
deeper pockets, more control, or greater ability to distribute risk than
some other class. Insofar as contractors and employers are concerned,
these generalizations are of questionable validity. Douglas suggested
that the alternative to general rules based on uncertain premises is
for the courts to engage in a case by case inquiry into the differential
include at least part of the cost in his price. In that sense, the employer of the judgment-
proof contractor can be viewed as benefiting from both the employer's general insulation
from liability and the lower cost due to the contractor's refusal to insure. The employer
can thus be regarded as a fitting party on whom to impose liability. This seems to be the
unstated reasoning of those who would hold the employer of a financially irresponsible
contractor liable. See, e.g., Morris, supra note 4, at 844.
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abilities of contractors and employers to distribute and prevent risk.
Yet the analysis this alternative necessitates may not be within the
competence of any court to make and, in any event, involves high ad-
ministrative costs.71
III. Tim JOINT LIABILITY APPROACH
The most rational solution to the independent contractor problem
is to expand the scope of legal liability to include both the contractor
and the employer, and to allow private law distribution of risk between
the two parties. Under this rule, if the independent contractor com-
mits any tort, the victim would have a cause of action against the
employer, the contractor, or both as joint tortfeasors.72 The employer
and contractor could avoid the imposition of arbitrary liability by
concluding an indemnification agreement. The party who can avoid
the risk or insure against possible liability at the lowest cost would
become the indemnitor and the other party the indemnitee. Since the
relative abilities of the parties may differ according to the type of risk
involved, the agreement could assign some liabilities to the employer
while reserving others to the contractor.
This arrangement would conform the law of the independent con-
tractor to that of master/servant, except for a difference in the nature
of the indemnification. A master is permitted to recover over against
the servant as a matter of right, and, therefore, any joint suit against
master and servant is, in theory, one against the servant until his re-
sources are exhausted, and against the master for the remainder.73 In
the case of indemnification agreements, however, the ultimate liability
would be determined by contract. Because indemnification by private
bargain would more regularly place liability on the better risk admin-
istrator than any indemnification imposed by rule of law, joint liability
supplemented by private agreement is preferable to a rule comparable
to respondeat superior.
The joint liability approach would also entail significant savings in
transaction costs. All of the old "exceptions" to the independent con-
tractor rule would be eliminated, as would costly litigation over the
definition of "independent contractor," "inherently dangerous," "non-
71 Cf. Posner, supra note 8, at 43.
72 Liability may sometimes be imposed on both the independent contractor and his
employer, but such cases are probably highly unusual. See, e.g., Simmons v. Kelly, No.
72-2608 (5th Cir. Apr. 12, 1973).
73 Masters do not generally pursue their right of indemnification against servants. 2
F. HARXER & F. JAAEs, supra note 1, § 13.4, at 771. But employers probably would act
differently on their indemnification rights against contractors under a rule comparable to
respondeat superior. Id. § 26.1, at 1363.
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delegable duty," and so on. The sole question remaining for litigation
would be whether a tort occurred; allocation of liability would have
occurred beforehand pursuant to private agreement between the par-
ties.
Indemnification agreements are incompatible with the present lia-
bility rules, and would be facilitated by the joint liability approach for
two reasons. First, indemnification can be effective only when there is
some certainty over who is liable at law; the ability to contract can
yield efficiency only when property rights-the object of the contract
-are settled. A complex assignment of liabilities produces either un-
certainty74 or a substantial investment in information needed to decide
whether a contract concerning liability is warranted. This uncertainty,
and the costs of resolving it, can be eliminated by introducing joint
liability 5
Second, any rule assigning liability initially to only one party creates
incentives for that party to be judgment-proof. If, for example, liability
is placed upon contractors, judgment-proof contractors will be able to
offer their services at a competitive advantage over solvent contractors;
since judgments cannot be collected from such contractors, they need
not include the cost of their torts in the price of their work. They will
gradually replace solvent contractors and safety precautions will not
be taken. The employer will not conclude an indemnification agree-
ment since he is not liable initially, and is not being charged by the
contractor for the contractor's risk. For the employer to agree to pay
the judgment would be an act of altruism. The identical situation
obtains if the employer is liable. Judgment-proof employers will have
a competitive advantage, less safe methods will be used, and victims
will go uncompensated. The rule against incompetent and insolvent
contractors76 attempts to deal exactly with this problem, but that rule
creates insuperable problems of definition and is quite costly to ad-
minister. These costs can be avoided by a system of joint liability.
The common law presents an additional bar to the use of indemnifi-
cation agreements. Although the majority rule is that parties can
validly contract that one shall be liable for any damage sustained by
the other, regardless of fault,77 other courts have struck down private
74 See text at notes 68-70 supra.
75 For the role of private indemnification agreement in joint liability, see text at
notes 80-81 infra.
76 See text at notes 42-48 supra.
77 E.g., Thompson-Starrett Co. v. Otis Elevator Co., 271 N.Y. 86, 2 N.E.2d 85 (1986);
Barrus v. Wilkinson, 16 Utah 2d 204, 898 P.2d 207 (1965); Griffiths v. Henry Broderick,
Inc., 27 Wash. 2d 901, 182 P.2d 18 (1947); see Curtis, Third Party Indemnity Among
Owners, Contractors and Subcontractors, 14 FEDERATION OF INS. COUNSEL 70, 71 (1964).
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indemnification agreements on public policy grounds.78 For example,
where an employer attempts to recover over from the contractor for a
judgment paid out to a workman or third party, the courts have held
the indemnification agreement ineffective if they perceived a great
disparity in bargaining power. Such a result has usually been possible
if the agreement is subject to an interpretation favorable to the weaker
party.7 9 The proposed change to joint liability would remove this im-
pediment to achievement of the goals of the tort law. Even if courts
continued to rely on "inequality of bargaining power," the "stronger"
party could purchase insurance himself and use his superior bargain-
ing position to deduct the amount of the premium from the compensa-
tion he would have paid, or add it to the price he would have charged,
the indemnitor. The indemnitor would thus become the conduit
through which the indemnitee obtains insurance.
The joint liability plan would fulfill all the goals of the tort law.
Victim compensation would be assured if either party is solvent,
whereas under the rule of employer nonliability the victim is com-
pensated only if the contractor is solvent. Furthermore, while the cur-
rent rule gives some advantage to judgment-proof contractors, the joint
liability approach would increase the likelihood that, in case an acci-
dent occurred, at least one of the parties would be solvent. Both parties
know that, even if they are judgment-proof when the contract is en-
tered, they may have accumulated assets by the time a tort occurs. In
order to avoid the possible loss of those assets, each party would either
insure, take steps to reduce the loss from torts, or pay the other party
to do so. In order to assure the indemnitor's compliance with the
agreement, the indemnitee would demand assurance of solvency-
usually in the form of a bond or insurance. These precautions would
serve to compensate victims at the same time as they produce invest-
ment in safety. If liability is assigned solely to one party, however, the
78 E.g., Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 351 F.2d 253 (9th Cir. 1965);
Basin Oil Co. v. Baash-Ross Tool Co., 125 Cal. App. 2d 578, 271 P.2d 122 (1954);
Otis Elevator Co., v. Maryland Cas. Co., 95 Colo. 99, 33 P.2d 974 (1934).
79 But the courts have gone far to find such interpretations. E.g., Pacific Indem. Co.
v. California Elec. Works, 29 Cal. App. 2d 260, 262, 84 P.2d 313, 314 (1938), in which
the court professed to find ambiguity in the following agreement and thus held that the
employer could not recover on its basis: "You will indemnify and save Company harmless
from and against any and all loss, damage, injury, liability, and claims, therefore, including
claims for injury and death to Company's employees and damage to Company's property
and claims and liens of workmen and materialmen, howsoever caused, resulting directly
or indirectly from the performance of this agreement, and will obtain and maintain in
effect insurance including workmen's compensation insurance, to protect Company from
the above in amount satisfactory to Company."
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solvent nonliable party will not demand these precautions of the
judgment-proof liable party.
Private indemnification agreements play an essential role in assur-
ing an optimal allocation of resources to risk prevention and compensa-
tion under joint liability rules. Barring such agreements, the parties
would insure against risk and take precautions to prevent accidents
only to the extent that they fear individual liability. If the employer
and the contractor mutually underestimate their chances of being sued,
there would be a failure to insure properly and to take cost justified
precautions80 If they overestimate their probable liability, there would
be a net loss in economic efficiency since insurance would be procured
and precautions would be taken that are, in the aggregate, more than
cost justified, thus resulting in a misallocation of resources. By fixing
liability with certainty, private indemnification agreements -prevent
the indemnitee from overinvesting in precautions or insurance, since
he can leave those matters to the indemnitor, who will be financially
responsible for all torts.8 '
In addition, joint liability would lead to the optimum amount of
safety. If an accident that would cost $100 can be prevented by the
employer for $60 and by the contractor for $40, the employer would,
under the joint liability rule, pay the contractor some sum greater than
$40 but less than $60 to assume the liability. The contractor would
then invest $40 in order to avoid the $100 liability. The same result
would follow if the positions of the employer and the contractor with
respect to accident prevention costs were reversed. If the loss is not pre-
ventable by an expenditure of less than $100, but one party can obtain
insurance more economically, the other party would pay him to do so
and to assume the liability.
If both parties are solvent, the optimal investment in safety, de-
scribed above, would follow directly. If neither party is solvent, no
investment in safety will be made under either the proposed or cur-
rent rule. Unlike the present rule, however, the joint liability rule
would lead to the optimal amount of safety even if only one of the
parties is solvent. The solvent party would invest to avert the harm if
he can do so less expensively, and he would pay the insolvent party
to do so if that party can do so at a lower cost. Finally, if both parties
are partially solvent, the joint liability rule would still encourage the
80 See Comment, Borrowed Servants and the Theory of Enterprise Liability, 76 YALE L.J.
807, 819 (1967).
81 The parties could also stipulate that the indemnitor, as the real party in interest,
would have control over the conduct of any tort action, thus avoiding the problem of
multiplicity of suits.
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investment in safety if the sum of the judgments obtainable against
the parties exceeds the cost of accident prevention. Assume that the
employer can prevent $100 in harm by investing $60, that the con-
tractor can prevent the harm by investing $40, and that both contrac-
tor and employer can each pay a judgment not exceeding $25. Under
the present liability rules neither party will invest in safety, since he
would have to expend at least $40 to avert a $25 loss to him. If, how-
ever, liability was joint and indemnity was permitted the employer
would offer up to $25 to the contractor to assume the liability; the
contractor would accept liability for any sum greater than $15; the
transaction would occur and the efficient investment in safety would
be made.
CONCLUSION
The independent contractor rule has proved difficult both to ad-
minister and to explain, because no one rule or series of rules of
liability can identify the proper risk bearer as efficiently as the market-
place. A better approach would be to make the employer and inde-
pendent contractor jointly liable for torts committed in the course
of their contract. By the use of private indemnification agreements,
problems of multiplicity of suits, overinsurance, and improper resource
allocation could be avoided. Moreover, the joint liability approach
would lead to a more reasonable, consistent rule of law, better risk
distribution and victim compensation, and the employment of con-
tractors who are financially more responsible.
James B. McHugh
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